8" H0WITZER SAVES THE DAY
8" HOWITZER 105mm HOWITZER
Any chance you see the difference??
by Lt J. Fred Oliver
PROLOGUE: This War Story is unique in many ways. First, the whole concept of Artillery direct support in Vietnam was that the 105mm howitzer was the "weapon of choice" for providing immediate, effective and blistering fire on the enemy and in support of our ground troops. But...what if that isn't possible? A good 2nd choice was helicopter gunships; they do a great job in tearing up the landscape and running the enemy scared. But...what if there are no gunships available? The most unlikely hero here, beside the great ingenuity and "presence of mind" of a very talented FO, Lt Oliver, who, even under fire from the enemy, found a way to use an 8" howitzer in a "direct support" of a saving the Infantry in contact with the enemy. The 8" howitzer has a "kill zone" of 300 meters, four times the kill zone of the 105mm howitzer. The 8" howitzer was never intended to be used in this manner, but that didn't stop Lt Oliver.
By Webmaster Dennis L Dauphin
On or about 4-29-68 while being assigned as a Forward Observer (FO) observer for “A”Company, 1/14th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, which at the time was in the vicinity of the An Loa Valley in South Viet Nam. We had been transported there by Hueys to a base camp located near Dak To. Unfortunately I have no written notes left from any assignment, however the memory of this nightmare will forever be part of my life. Battalion headquarters briefed our company commander, Captain Carter, that there was NVA activity in the Chu Pa mountains and the company was to conduct a search and destroy mission. Captain Carter led the light company of 125 men up into the highlands. After a 9 hour hike with no enemy contact we set up a dry camp with no tents, only C rations, and canteens filled with spring water laced with iodine tablets. We set up three two men out posts and I identified four points of vulnerability to order a fire mission with smoke rounds into those points in case of an attack. There was no activity that night which made for an easier trek up the double canopy mountainside the next morning. Captain Carter sent out a three man point unit and two three men side flanks. As we proceeded to hump up the mountain we could see well used trails and both abandoned NVA and US Army firing positions left from previous years of fire fights. At about 1100 hours we took a break for a lunch and bit of rest. Captain Carter radioed a report to the platoon leaders around 1145 hours. Within 15 minutes the point men and the right flank radioed in that there was significant movement of troops in the area. Ten minutes later the enemy opened fire with automatic weapons on the right flank and the point area where our men returned fire. Shortly after enemy mortar rounds began to impact the area near the point men’s location.
I identified the area the best I could on the map where the men were being hammered and called for fire with an impact zone 250 meters farther up the mountain. I called for a round of smoke which landed significantly farther up the hill from where I had anticipated. It was difficult to get readings from where I was located in the double canopy jungle. I asked my RTO Briggs to saddle up the radio and follow me up the hill to a better viewing area near a crag in the mountain where I could see through the jungle. Captain Carter was requesting gunship support but the ships were already committed and there was no support available. Briggs and I had taken no more than twenty paces when two 60mm rounds landed in our immediate area wounding my RTO Briggs, my Recon Sergeant, Captain Carter, the Staff Sergeant, and two soldiers. Fortunately I was not injured but the radio on Brigg’s back was severely damaged by the impact of one of the rounds. The medic addressed the wounded as best he could and I grabbed the radio from the second squad leader and I proceeded up the hill and called for another smoke with a 50 meter drop in adjustment. The smoke round impact was deflected by the canopy. The FDC informed me that given the fire base location and alignment that it would be dangerous to provide the support. In the meantime the fire fight continued with little maneuvering by our grunts and an ongoing onslaught of 60mm rounds. The fire direction center reached out to me with news that there was a 8” gun 12 Ks away that could make the shot. With new frequencies I contacted the related 8” gun FDC (Fire Direction Center) and called for a single round to make sure the round would get through the canopy before exploding. Given the battery location when fired the 8” round sounded a bit like a waffling freight train as it sailed over our heads impacting 200 meters up the hillside. I got immediate response from our troops that the round was still too high above the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) who had dug in their two 60mm mortar tubes. Given how dangerous 8” round killing radius could impact our men, I resolved to move farther up the hill. I was moving awkwardly given I was carrying my M16, three bandoliers, 7 grenades, two canteens, and the radio. I heard movement from the area to my lower right, and given I was making another “danger close” adjustment with the FDC, I elected to throw a grenade into that area. I pulled the pin and was about to throw it when the sound became recognizable as our men. I finally relocated the pulled pin and gingerly reinserted it into the grenade. Just then semi- automatic fire opened up towards our men from higher up the hill and it was met with returned fire. I called for a significant correction of fire from the 8” gun which quickly silenced the NVA fire for a short while. I then proceeded up the hill making adjustments and calling for one available round at a time. In time I noticed that the NVA’s 60mm tubes had been relocated farther up the mountain. The 8” rounds were certainly beginning to have a significant impact. I changed frequencies back to the company and learned that the gun ships that Captain Carter had requested earlier were still unavailable. I also learned that a mechanized unit in a nearby valley had requested that I defer from using the 8” gun for fear that the rounds could possibly soar over the mountain and into their camp. I “laughed” in profanity which the armored group reluctantly understood and negated their request.
Next I entered an area where a fire had leveled a bamboo thicket within the past 90 days. Pausing I looked up the hill and was lucky to spot an NVA spotter’s glasses reflecting the light for just a moment and could sense a calmness that quieted my nerves. Refocusing I got a burst of energy and crawled farther up the hill to an impact crater left by one of the 8” rounds I had called in earlier. From that position I could hear the report of two 60mmm rounds being fired by the NVA troops. Looking back from my position in the crater sadly, I saw that two of our men who had been moving up behind me and into the vicinity I had just vacated had been severely wounded by the impact of the two rounds. I moved on up to the next crater and adjusted fire to where I had seen the reflection off the glass earlier and figured it was approximately 100 meters from where I laid. I requested three rounds in rapid fire. The impacts were significant and silenced the mortars. Proceeding up the hill I encountered single fire rounds and jumped into the last of the three round craters and was calling for another adjustment when a Chicom (Chinese) grenade was tossed into my location. From out of nowhere the Second Platoon leader jumped into the crater with me and picked up the grenade and threw it out where it immediately exploded. He had saved us both from severe injury or death. While I made fire adjustments my hero looked over the brim of the crater and opened fire with his M16. Fire was returned and he lobbed a frag grenade which silenced the NVA fire. Thereafter the balance of the second platoon moved up the hill and secured the area. I continued calling in single 8” rounds up to a plateau and eventually all NVA fire stopped.
During the next three hours the men from the company searched the area. They found a significant number of tunnels. As night approached a perimeter defense position was established. Medivac choppers came in and took out 8 severely wounded soldiers to include my RTO Briggs and Recon Sargent and three KIA. Another 8 wounded men including Captain Carter were tended to by our medics. The next day upon further inspection we discovered a tunnel system that had been vacated by the NVA and had been used as a temporary field hospital. Surely that is the reason the NVA had maintained contact for such an extended time. We held our position for another 48 hours.
During
the course of this time we resupplied, shipped more injured men out, received a
few replacements, and a Catholic priest came out and held a service in memory
of the dead and prayers for the wounded. Eventually Hueys came in one at a time
and moved us back to the fire base camp where the 8”gun that had given us so
much support was located. After a shower, I ate some hots, and then I thanked
the FDC and crew of the 8”gun who had managed to save so many of our men with
their skills. This is just my story reflecting from that experience and I am
sure all the men whom survived would relive it from their own perspective but we
all would say “Thank God I survived”!
Webmaster's Footnote: If the US Army told us that there were tunnels throughout Vietnam, I must have missed that bulletin. FO Oliver deserves more than a medal and a "Welcome Home, Brother". But you won't hear that from a corrupted news media. This Officer makes the Field Artillery very proud.