Rushing ahead to modern times, here is a thought-provoking article.
Should our
general officers state their beliefs, resign their commission, or just protect
their careers
when faced with operations that are not militarily sound?
By
FRED KAPLAN
On Aug.
1, Gen. Richard Cody, the United States Army’s vice chief of staff, flew to
the sprawling base at
Yingling’s
article — published in the May issue of Armed Forces Journal — noted that a
key role of generals is to advise policy makers and the public on the means
necessary to win wars. “If the general remains silent while the statesman
commits a nation to war with insufficient means,” he wrote, “he shares
culpability for the results.” Today’s generals “failed to envision the
conditions of future combat and prepare their forces accordingly,” and they
failed to advise policy makers on how much force would be necessary to win and
stabilize Iraq. These failures, he insisted, stemmed not just from the civilian
leaders but also from a military culture that “does little to reward
creativity and moral courage.” He concluded, “As matters stand now, a
private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who
loses a war.”
General Cody looked around the auditorium,
packed with men and women in uniform — most of them in their mid-20s, three
decades his junior but far more war-hardened than he or his peers were at the
same age — and turned Captain Wignall’s question around. “You all have
just come from combat, you’re young captains,” he said, addressing the
entire room. “What’s your opinion of the general officers corps?”
Over the next 90 minutes, five captains
stood up, recited their names and their units and raised several of Yingling’s
criticisms. One asked why the top generals failed to give political leaders full
and frank advice on how many troops would be needed in
Challenges like this are rare in the
military, which depends on obedience and hierarchy. Yet the scene at
Colonel Yingling’s article gave these
tensions voice; it spelled out the issues and the stakes; and it located their
roots in the Army’s own institutional culture, specifically in the growing
disconnect between this culture — which is embodied by the generals — and
the complex realities that junior officers, those fighting the war, are
confronting daily on the ground. The article was all the more potent because it
was written by an active-duty officer still on the rise. It was a career risk,
just as, on a smaller scale, standing up and asking the Army vice chief of staff
about the article was a risk.
In response to the captains’ questions,
General Cody acknowledged, as senior officers often do now, that the
Before and just after America’s entry
into World War II, Gen. George Marshall, the Army’s chief of staff, purged 31
of his 42 division and corps commanders, all of them generals, and 162 colonels
on the grounds that they were unsuited for battle. Over the course of the war,
he rid the Army of 500 colonels. He reached deep into the lower ranks to find
talented men to replace them. For example, Gen. James Gavin, the highly
decorated commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, was a mere major in December
1941 when the Japanese bombed
On the lower end of the scale, things have
changed — but for the worse. West
Point cadets are obligated to stay in the Army for five years after
graduating. In a typical year, about a quarter to a third of them decide not to
sign on for another term. In 2003, when the class of 1998 faced that decision,
only 18 percent quit the force: memories of 9/11 were still vivid; the war in
Col. Don Snider, a longtime professor at
The gap is widening further, Snider told
me, because of this war’s operating tempo, the “unrelenting pace” at which
soldiers are rotated into Iraq for longer tours — and a greater number of
tours — than they signed up for. Many soldiers, even those who support the
war, are wearying of the endless cycle. The cycle is a result of two decisions.
The first occurred at the start of the war, when the senior officers assented to
the decision by Donald
Rumsfeld, then the secretary of defense, to send in far fewer troops
than they had recommended. The second took place two years later, well into the
insurgency phase of the war, when top officers declared they didn’t need more
troops, though most of them knew that in fact they did. “Many junior
officers,” Snider said, “see this op tempo as stemming from the failure of
senior officers to speak out.”
Paul Yingling did not set out to cause a
stir. He grew up in a working-class part of
“When I was in the gulf war, I remember
thinking, This is easier than it was at training exercises,” he told me
earlier this month. He was sent to
Upon returning, he spent the next six years
pondering that question. He studied international relations at the University
of Chicago’s graduate school and wrote a master’s thesis about the
circumstances under which outside powers can successfully intervene in civil
wars. (One conclusion: There aren’t many.) He then taught at
In the late fall of 2003, his first tour of
duty over, Yingling was sent to Fort Sill, Okla., the Army’s main base for
artillery soldiers, and wrote long memos to the local generals, suggesting new
approaches to the war in Iraq. One suggestion was that since artillery rockets
were then playing little role, artillery soldiers should become more skilled in
training Iraqi soldiers; that, he thought, would be vital to
The commander of the third regiment, Col.
H. R. McMaster, was a historian as well as a decorated soldier. He figured that
In February 2006, Yingling returned to
That December, Yingling attended a Purple
Heart ceremony for soldiers wounded in
Soon after Yingling’s article appeared,
Maj. Gen. Jeff Hammond, commander of the Fourth Infantry Division at
The “trust gap” between junior and
senior officers is hardly universal. Many junior officers at
An hour after General Cody’s talk at
Lt. Col. Allen Gill, who just retired as
director of the R.O.T.C. program at Georgetown
University, has heard versions of this discussion among his cadets for
years. He raises a different concern about the Army’s “can do” culture.
“You’re not brought up in the Army to tell people how you can’t get things
done, and that’s fine, that’s necessary,” he said. “But when you get
promoted to a higher level of strategic leadership, you have to have a different
outlook. You’re supposed to make clear, cold calculations of risk — of the
probabilities of victory and defeat.”
The problem, he said, is that it’s hard
for officers — hard for people in any profession — to switch their basic
approach to life so abruptly. As Yingling put it in his article, “It is
unreasonable to expect that an officer who spends 25 years conforming to
institutional expectations will emerge as an innovator in his late 40s.”
Yingling’s commander at Tal Afar, H. R.
McMaster, documented a similar crisis in the case of the Vietnam War. Twenty
years after the war, McMaster wrote a doctoral dissertation that he turned into
a book called “Dereliction of Duty.” It concluded that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in the 1960s betrayed their professional obligations by
failing to provide unvarnished military advice to President Lyndon
B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as they plunged into
the Southeast Asian quagmire. When McMaster’s book was published in 1997, Gen.
Hugh Shelton, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ordered all commanders to read
it — and to express disagreements to their superiors, even at personal risk.
Since then, “Dereliction of Duty” has been recommended reading for Army
officers.
Yet before the start of the
McMaster’s own fate has reinforced these
apprehensions. President Bush has singled out McMaster’s campaign at Tal Afar
as a model of successful strategy. Gen. David
Petraeus, now commander of
McMaster’s nonpromotion has not been
widely reported, yet every officer I spoke with knew about it and had pondered
its implications. One colonel, who asked not to be identified because he
didn’t want to risk his own ambitions, said: “Everyone studies the
brigadier-general promotion list like tarot cards — who makes it, who
doesn’t. It communicates what qualities are valued and not valued.” A
retired Army two-star general, who requested anonymity because he didn’t want
to anger his friends on the promotion boards, agreed. “When you turn down a
guy like McMaster,” he told me, “that sends a potent message to everybody
down the chain. I don’t know, maybe there were good reasons not to promote
him. But the message everybody gets is: ‘We’re not interested in rewarding
people like him. We’re not interested in rewarding agents of change.’ ”
Members of the board, he said, want to
promote officers whose careers look like their own. Today’s generals rose
through the officer corps of the peacetime Army. Many of them fought in the last
years of
“Those rewarded are the can-do, go-to
people,” the retired two-star general told me. “Their skill is making the
trains run on time. So why are we surprised that, when the enemy becomes
adaptive, we get caught off guard? If you raise a group of plumbers, you
shouldn’t be upset if they can’t do theoretical physics.”
There are, of course, exceptions, most
notably General Petraeus. He wrote an article for a recent issue of The American
Interest, a Washington-based public-policy journal, urging officers to attend
civilian graduate schools and get out of their “intellectual comfort zones”
— useful for dealing with today’s adaptive enemies.
Yet many Army officers I spoke with say
Petraeus’s view is rare among senior officers. Two colonels told me that when
they were captains, their commanders strongly discouraged them from attending
not just graduate school but even the Army’s Command and
Harvard’s merits aside, some junior
officers agree that the promotion system discourages breadth. Capt. Kip
Kowalski, an infantry officer in the Captains Career Course at
In October 2006, seven months before his
essay on the failure of generalship appeared, Yingling and Lt. Col. John Nagl,
another innovative officer, wrote an article for Armed Forces Journal called
“New Rules for New Enemies,” in which they wrote: “The best way to change
the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for
professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more
adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.”
In late June, Yingling took command of an
artillery battalion. This means he will most likely be promoted to full colonel.
This assignment, however, was in the works nearly a year ago, long before he
wrote his critique of the generals. His move and probable promotion say nothing
about whether he’ll be promoted further — or whether, as some of his
admirers fear, his career will now grind to a halt.
Nagl — the author of an acclaimed book
about counterinsurgency (“Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife”), a former
operations officer in Iraq and the subject of a New York Times Magazine article
a few years ago — has since taken command of a unit at Fort Riley, Kan., that
trains United States soldiers to be advisers to Iraqi security forces. Pentagon
officials have said that these advisers are crucial to
Lt. Col. Isaiah Wilson, a professor at West
Point and former planning officer in Iraq with the 101st Airborne Division, said
the fate of Nagl’s unit — the degree to which it attracted capable,
ambitious soldiers — depended on the answer to one question: “Will serving
as an adviser be seen as equal to serving as a combat officer in the eyes of the
promotion boards? The jury is still out.”
“Guys like Yingling, Nagl and McMaster
are the canaries in the coal mine of Army reform,” the retired two-star
general I spoke with told me. “Will they get promoted to general? If they do,
that’s a sign that real change is happening. If they don’t, that’s a sign
that the traditional culture still rules.”
Failure sometimes compels an institution to
change its ways. The last time the Army undertook an overhaul was in the wake of
the Vietnam War. At the center of those reforms was an officer named Huba Wass
de Czege. Wass de Czege (pronounced VOSH de tsay-guh) graduated from West Point
and served two tours of duty in
In 1982, he was ordered to rewrite the
Army’s field manual on combat operations. At his own initiative, he read the
classics of military strategy — Clausewitz’s “On War,” Sun Tzu’s
“Art of War,” B. H. Liddell Hart’s “Strategy” — none of which had
been on his reading list at West Point. And he incorporated many of their
lessons along with his own experiences from
Now a retired one-star general, though an
active Army consultant, Wass de Czege has publicly praised Yingling’s article.
(Yingling was a graduate of SAMS in 2002, well after its founder moved on.) In
an essay for the July issue of Army magazine, Wass de Czege wrote that today’s
junior officers “feel they have much relevant experience [that] those senior
to them lack,” yet the senior officers “have not listened to them.” These
junior officers, he added, remind him of his own generation of captains, who
held the same view during and just after
“The crux of the problem in our Army,”
Wass de Czege wrote, “is that officers are not systematically taught how to
cope with unstructured problems.” Counterinsurgency wars, like those in
Speaking by phone from his home outside
The day after his talk at
There is a specter haunting the debate over
Yingling’s article — the specter of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. During World War
II, Gen. Dwight
D. Eisenhower threatened to resign if the civilian commanders didn’t
order air support for the invasion of
The very discussion of these issues
discomforts many senior officers because they take very seriously the principle
of civilian control. They believe it is not their place to challenge the
president or his duly appointed secretary of defense, certainly not in public,
especially not in wartime. The ethical codes are ambiguous on how firmly an
officer can press an argument without crossing the line. So, many generals
prefer to keep a substantial distance from that line — to keep the prospect of
a constitutional crisis from even remotely arising.
On a blog Yingling maintains at the Web
site of Small Wars Journal, an independent journal of military theory, he has
acknowledged these dilemmas, but he hasn’t disentangled them. For example, if
generals do speak up, and the president ignores their advice, what should they
do then — salute and follow orders, resign en masse or criticize the president
publicly? At this level of discussion, the junior and midlevel officers feel
uncomfortable, too.
Yingling’s concern is more narrowly
professional, but it should matter greatly to future policy makers who want to
consult their military advisers. The challenge is how to ensure that generals
possess the experience and analytical prowess to formulate sound military advice
and the “moral courage,” as Yingling put it, to take responsibility for that
advice and for its resulting successes or failures. The worry is that too few
generals today possess either set of qualities — and that the promotional
system impedes the rise of officers who do.
As today’s captains and majors come up
through the ranks, the culture may change. One question is how long that will
take. Another question is whether the most innovative of those junior officers
will still be in the Army by the time the top brass decides reform is necessary.
As Colonel Wilson, the